Public key encryption with equality test (PKEET) allows the testing of equality of underlying messages of two ciphertexts. PKEET is a potential candidate for many practical applications like efficient data management on encrypted databases. Identity-based encryption scheme with equality test (IBEET), which was introduced by Ma (Information Science 2016), can simplify the certificate management of PKEET. Potential applicability of IBEET leads to intensive research from its first instantiation. Ma's IBEET and most of the constructions are proven secure in the random oracle model based on number-theoretic hardness assumptions which are vulnerable in the post-quantum era. Recently, Lee et al. (ePrint 2016) proposed a generic construction of IBEET schemes in the standard model and hence it is possible to yield the first instantiation of IBEET schemes based on lattices. Their method is to use a 3-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme together with a one-time signature scheme. In this paper, we propose, for the first time, a concrete construction of an IBEET scheme based on the hardness assumption of lattices in the standard model and compare the data sizes with the instantiation from Lee et al. (ePrint 2016). Further, we have modified our proposed IBEET to make it secure against insider attack. * see Appendix A; * * Data sizes are in number of field elements. In case of [7], we do not count the part of ciphertex which is possible to obtain from the public key.
Introduction
The concept of IBEET is the combination of PKEET and identity-based encryption (IBE). IBEET can simplify the certificate management of PKEET with all messages encrypted with the receiver's public identity. IBEET is a special kind of IBE featuring equality test between ciphertexts under different as well as the same identity. This property is very useful in various practical applications, such as keyword search on encrypted data, encrypted data partitioning for efficient encrypted data management, personal health record system and spam filtering in encrypted email systems. Due to its numerous practical applications, there have been elegant research outcomes in this direction with the appearance of improved schemes or ones with additional functionalities [10, 8, 15] . However, they are all proven secure in the random oracle model which does not exist in reality. Therefore it is necessary to construct such a scheme in the standard model. Moreover, all aforementioned existing schemes base their security on some number-theoretic hardness assumptions which will be efficiently solved in the quantum era [13] . Up to the present, there is only one IBEET scheme secure in the standard model, which was generically constructed by Lee et al. [7] . Their method is to use a 3-level hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme together with a one-time signature scheme. This is the first one with the possibility of yielding a post-quantum instantiation based on lattices, since lattice-based cryptography is the only one among other post-quantum areas up to present offers HIBE primitives, e.g., [1] . Hence it remains a question of either yielding an efficient instantiation or directly constructing an IBEET based on lattices.
On the other hand, supporting equality tests makes the security of IBEET schemes weaken. If the adversary can have a trapdoor for the equality test on the target ciphertext, he can generate a ciphertext of any message by himself and perform equality tests between the target ciphertext and the ciphertext generated by himself. We call this type of attacks as an insider attack [15] . IBEET secure against insider attack is proposed by Wu et al. [15] . There is a security flaw which is fixed by Lee et al. [9] . However, the construction is secure in the random oracle model based on number-theoretic hardness assumption. So, it is required to consider the secure construction in standard model based on the hardness assumptions which will remain secure in post-quantum era. Our contribution: In this paper, our contribution is twofold:
-According to the best of our knowledge, we propose the first concrete construction of an addaptive secure IBEET scheme secure in the standard model based on the hardness assumption of lattices. From Table 1 , it is evident that the proposed construction outperformed the instantiation from [7] . [7] Our ideas come from the use of the full lattice-based IBE in the standard model by Agrawal et al. [1] and a recent technique by Duong et al. [6] in directly constructing a PKEET based on lattices in the standard model. Remark 1. Our proposed schemes achieve only IND-CPA security (defined in Section 2), which can be modified to achieve IND-CCA2 security by using the HIBE scheme in [1] through the BCHK's transformation [4] . Hence in definition of security model in Section 2, we provide only the definition of CPA-security models, in which the adversary cannot query the decryption oracle. Correctness. We say that an IBEET scheme is correct if the following conditions hold:
(1) For any security parameter λ, any user ID i and any message m, it holds that
(2) For any security parameter λ, any users ID i , ID j and any messages m i , m j , it holds that:
Security model of IBEET. For the security model of IBEET, we consider two types of adversaries:
• Type-I adversary: for this type, the adversary can request to issue a trapdoor for the target identity and thus can perform equality tests on the challenge ciphertext. The aim of this type of adversaries is to reveal the message in the challenge ciphertext. • Type-II adversary: for this type, the adversary cannot request to issue a trapdoor for the target identity and thus cannot perform equality tests on the challenge ciphertext. The aim of this type of adversaries is to distinguish which message is in the challenge ciphertext between two candidates.
The security model of a IBEET scheme against two types of adversaries above is described in the following.
OW-ID-CPA security against Type-I adversaries. We illustrate the game between a challenger C and a Type-I adversary A who can have a trapdoor for all ciphertexts of the target identity, say ID * , that he wants to attack, as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate the pair (PP, MSK), and sends the public parameter PP to A.
Phase 1:
The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times adaptively and in any order to the following oracles: -O Ext : an oracle that on input an identity ID (different from ID * ), returns the ID's secret key SK ID . -O Td : an oracle that on input an identity ID, return td ID by running td ID ← Td(SK ID ) using the secret key SK ID of the identity ID. 3. Challenge: C chooses a random message m in the message space and run CT * ID * ← Enc(PP, ID * , m), and sends CT * ID * to A. 4. Phase 2: A can query as in Phase 1 with the constraint that the identity ID * cannot be queried to the key generation oracle O Ext . 5. Guess: A output m .
The adversary A wins the above game if m = m and the success probability of A is defined as
If the message space is polynomial in the security parameter or the min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the security parameter then a Type-I adversary A with a trapdoor for the challenge ciphertext can reveal the message in polynomial-time or small exponential time in the security parameter, by performing the equality tests with the challenge ciphertext and all other ciphertexts of all messages generated by himself. Hence to prevent this attack, we assume that the size of the message space M is exponential in the security parameter and the min-entropy of the message distribution is sufficiently higher than the security parameter.
IND-ID-CPA security against Type-II adversaries. We present the game between a challenger C and a Type-II adversary A who cannot have a trapdoor for all ciphertexts of the target identity ID * as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate (PP, MSK) and gives the public parameter PP to A. 2. Phase 1: The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times adaptively and in any order to the following oracles: -O Ext : an oracle that on input an identity ID (different from ID * ), returns the ID's secret key SK ID . -O Td : an oracle that on input an identity ID, return td ID by running td ID ← Td(SK ID ) using the secret key SK ID of the identity ID. 
IBEET against insider attack
Definition 4. An IBEET against insider attack consists of the following polynomialtime algorithms:
-Setup(λ): On input a security parameter λ, it outputs a public parameter PP, a master secret key MSK and a master token key MTK. -Extract(ID, MSK, MTK): On input an identity ID, the master secret key MSK and a master token key MTK, it outputs the secret key SK ID and token tok ID for the identity ID. It is assumed that SK ID and tok ID are delivered to the user of identity ID and the token tok ID is delivered to all group users via secure channel. -Enc(PP, m, ID, tok ID ): On input PP, an identity ID with its token tok ID and a message m, it outputs a ciphertext CT. -Dec(CT, SK ID , tok ID ): On input a ciphertext CT, the secret key SK ID and token tok ID of the identity ID, it outputs a message m or ⊥. -Test(CT i , CT j ): On input two ciphertexts CT i and CT j , it outputs 1 or 0.
Correctness. We say that the above IBEET is correct if the following holds:
(1) For any security parameter λ, identity ID and message m, it holds that
and CT ← Enc(PP, m, ID, tok ID ).
(2) For any security parameter λ, identities ID i , ID j and messages m i , m j , it holds that
is 1 if m i = m j and negligible in the security parameter λ otherwise.
Security model. The security model of IBEET against insider attack [15] is slightly weaker than the formal security model of traditional IBE. In such a scheme, two messages m 0 and m 1 submitted by the adversary to the challenger should not be queried to the encryption oracle before and after the challenge phase. We call this security model the weak indistinguishability under adaptive identity and chosen message attacks (wIND-ID-CPA). In particular, we present the game between the challenger C and the adversary A as the following.
1. Setup: The challenger C runs Setup(λ) to generate (PP, MSK, MTK) and gives the public parameter PP to A.
Phase 1:
The adversary A may make queries polynomially many times adaptively and in any order to the following oracles: -O Ext : an oracle that on input an identity ID, returns the ID's secret key SK ID , where (SK ID , tok ID ) ← Extract(ID, MSK, MTK). -O Enc : an oracle that on input a pair of an identity ID and a message m, returns the output of Enc(PP, m, ID, tok ID ). 3. Challenge: A submits a target identity ID * and two messages m 0 , m 1 of same length to C, where ID * was never queried to O Ext and m 0 , m 1 were never queried to O Enc in Phase 1. Then C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs
Phase 2:
A can query as in Phase 1 with the following constraints:
-The target identity ID * cannot be queried to O Ext ; -The submitted messages m 0 , m 1 cannot be queried to O Enc ; 5. Guess: A outputs a bit b .
The adversary A wins the above game if b = b and the advantage of A is defined as
Lattices
Throughout the paper, we will mainly focus on integer lattices, which are discrete
We call n the rank of Λ and if n = m we say that Λ is a full rank lattice. In this paper, we mainly consider full rank lattices containing qZ m , called q-ary lattices, defined as the following, for a given matrix
We denote by S := max i s i for i = 1, · · · , k, the maximum l 2 length of the vectors in S. We also denoteS := {s 1 , · · · ,s k } the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors s 1 , · · · , s k in that order. We refer to S the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Ajtai [2] first proposed how to sample a uniform matrix A ∈ Z n×m q with an associated basis S A of Λ ⊥ q (A) with low Gram-Schmidt norm. It is improved later by Alwen and Peikert [3] in the following Theorem. with all but negligible probability in n.
Definition 1 (Gaussian distribution). Let Λ ⊆ Z m be a lattice. For a vector c ∈ R m and a positive parameter σ ∈ R, define:
The discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center c and parameter σ is
For convenience, we will denote by ρ σ and D Λ.σ for ρ 0,σ and D Λ,σ,0 respectively. When σ = 1 we will write ρ instead of ρ 1 . We recall below in Theorem 2 some useful results. The first one comes from [11, Lemma 4.4] . The second one is from [5] and formulated in [1, Theorem 17 ] and the last one is from [1, Theorem 19] .
The security of our construction reduces to the LWE (Learning With Errors) problem introduced by Regev [12] .
Definition 2 (LWE problem). Consider publicly a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Z q . An (Z q , n, χ)-LWE problem instance consists of access to an unspecified challenge oracle O, being either a noisy pseudorandom sampler O s associated with a secret s ∈ Z n q , or a truly random sampler O $ who behaviors are as follows:
The (Z q , n, χ)-LWE problem allows responds queries to the challenge oracle O. We say that an algorithm A decides the (Z q , n, χ)-LWE problem if
is non-negligible for a random s ∈ Z n q .
Regev [12] showed that (see Theorem 3 below) when χ is the distribution Ψ α of the random variable qX mod q where α ∈ (0, 1) and X is a normal random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation α/ √ 2π then the LWE problem is hard.
Theorem 3. If there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for deciding the (Z q , n, Ψ α )-LWE problem for q > 2 √ n/α then there is an efficient quantum algorithm for approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems, to withiñ O(n/α) factors in the l 2 norm, in the worst case.
Hence if we assume the hardness of approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems in lattices of dimension n to within polynomial (in n) factors, then it follows from Theorem 3 that deciding the LWE problem is hard when n/α is a polynomial in n. 
Output SK
,σ respectively. Encrypt(PP, ID, m) : On input the public parameter PP, an identity ID and a message m ∈ {0, 1} t , do:
5. Choose l uniformly random matrices R i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m for i = 1, · · · , l and define
8. The ciphertext is
Decrypt(PP, SK ID , CT) : On input public parameter PP, private key SK ID = (E ID , E ID ) and a ciphertext CT = (CT 1 , CT 2 , CT 3 , CT 4 ), do:
For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w i and q 2 . If they are close, output m i = 1 and otherwise output m i = 0. We then obtain the message m.
If they are close, output h i = 1 and otherwise output h i = 0. We then obtain the vector h. Proof. It is easy to see that if CT is a valid ciphertext of m then the decryption will always output m. Moreover, if CT IDi and CT IDj are valid ciphertext of m and m of identities ID i and ID j respectively. Then the Test process checks whether H(m) = H(m ). If so then it outputs 1, meaning that m = m , which is always correct with overwhelming probability since H is collision resistant. Hence, proposed IBEET described above is correct.
Parameters
We follow [1, Section 7.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the system to work correctly we need to ensure the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e., q = Ω(σm 3/2 ) and α < [σlmω( √ log m)] −1 , that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q, that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω( √ log m),
that Regev's reduction applies, i.e., q > 2 √ n/α, that our security reduction applies (i.e., q > 2Q where Q is the number of identity queries from the adversary).
Hence the following choice of parameters (q, m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the above conditions, taking n to be the security parameter:
and round up m to the nearest larger integer and q to the nearest larger prime.
Here we assume that δ is such that n δ > log q = O(log n). In [1, Section 7.5], it is shown that one can remove the restriction q > 2Q and that q = m 2.5 ω( √ log n) is sufficient.
Security analysis
In this section, we claim that our proposed scheme is OW-ID-CPA secure against Type-I adversaries (cf. Theorem 5) and IND-ID-CPA secure against Type-II adversaries (cf. Theorem 6). The proofs will follow a similar argument of Theorem 8. We omit them in the current version and refer to the full version.
Theorem 5. The IBEET with parameters (q, n, m, σ, α) as in (1) is OW-ID-CPA secure provided that H is a one-way hash function and the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A that wins the OW-ID-CPA game with advantage , then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE problem with advantage such that
where H,OW is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H. Theorem 6. The IBEET with parameters (q, n, m, σ, α) as in (1) is IND-ID-CPA secure provided that H is a one-way hash function and the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A that wins the IND-ID-CPA game with advantage , then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE problem with advantage such that
where H,OW is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H. 
Extract(ID, MSK, MTK) : On input a master secret key MSK, a master token MTK and an identity ID
On input the public parameter PP, an identity ID with its token tok ID and a message m ∈ {0, 1} t , do:
4. Choose l uniformly random matrices R i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m for i = 1, · · · , l and define R ID = l i=1 b i R i ∈ {−l, · · · , l} m×m . 5. Choose y ∈ Ψ m α and set z = R T ID y ∈ Z m q . 6. Compute
7. The ciphertext is
Decrypt(SK ID , tok ID , CT) : On input the private key SK ID = E ID , token tok ID = T A and a ciphertext CT = (CT 1 , CT 2 , CT 3 ), do:
For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w i and q 2 . If they are close, output m i = 1 and otherwise output m i = 0. We then obtain the message m. Proof. It is easy to see that if CT is a valid ciphertext of m then the decryption will always output m. Moreover, if CT IDi and CT IDj are valid ciphertext of m and m of identities ID i and ID j respectively. Then the Test process checks whether H(m T A ) = H(m T A ). If so then it outputs 1, meaning that m = m , which is always correct with overwhelming probability since H is collision resistant. Hence, proposed construction described above is correct.
In this section, we prove that our IBEET scheme is wIND-ID-CPA secure.
Theorem 8. The IBEET construction with parameters (q, n, m, σ, α) as in (1) is wIND-ID-CPA secure provided that H is a one-way hash function and the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE assumption holds. In particular, suppose there exists a probabilistic algorithm A that wins the wIND-ID-CPA game with advantage , then there is a probabilistic algorithm B that solves the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE problem with advantage such that
where H,OW is the advantage of breaking the one-wayness of H.
Proof. Assume that there is an adversary A who breaks the wIND-ID-CPA security of the IBEET scheme with non-negligible probability . We construct an algorithm B who solves the LWE problem using A. We now describe the behavior of B. Assume that ID * is the target identity of the adversary A and the challenge ciphertext is CT * ID * = (CT * ID * ,1 , CT * ID * ,2 , CT * ID * ,3 ). We will proceed the proof in a sequence of games. In game i, let W i denote the event that the adversary A correctly guesses the challenge bit. The adversary's advantage in Game i is Pr[W i ] − 1 2 . Game 0. This is the original wIND-ID-CPA game between the attacker A against the scheme and the wIND-ID-CPA challenger. Game 1. This is similar to Game 0 except the way the challenger B generates the public key for the identity ID * , as the following. Let R * i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m for i = 1, · · · , l be the ephemeral random matrices generated for the creation of the ciphertext CT * ID * . In this game, the challenger chooses l matrices R * i uniformly random in {−1, 1} m×m and chooses l random scalars h i ∈ Z q for i = 1, · · · , l. Then it generates A, T A and B as in Game 0 and constructs the matrices A i for i = 1, · · · , l as
The remainder of the game is unchanged with R * i , i = 1, · · · , l, used to generate the challenge ciphertext. Similar to the proof of [1, Theorem 25] we have that the A i are close to uniform and hence they are random independent matrices in the view of the adversary as in Game 0. Therefore
Game 2. This is similar to Game 1 except that at the challenge phase, B chooses arbitrary message m from the message space and encrypts m in CT ID,1 .
Other steps are similar to Game 1. Here we can not expect the behavior of A. Since A is public, A can obtain A H(m T A ). At the end if A outputs m , call this event E 2 , then A has broken the one-wayness of the hash function H. Therefore we have
where H,OW is the advantage of A in breaking the one-wayness of H. Game 3. This game is similar to Game 2 except that we add an abort that is independent of adversary's view. The challenger behaves as follows: -The setup phase is identical to Game 2 except that the challenger also chooses random h i ∈ Z q , i = 1, · · · , l and keeps it to itself. -In the final guess phase, the adversary outputs a random guess b ∈ {0, 1} for b. The challenger now does the following: 1. Abort check: for all queries CT ID to the decryption oracle O Dec , the challenger checks whether the identity
If not then the challenger overwrites b with a fresh random bit in {0, 1} and aborts the game. 2. Artificial abort: the challenger samples a message Γ such that Pr[Γ = 1] is calculated through a function G (defined as in [1] ) evaluated through all the queries of A. If Γ = 1 the challenger overwrites b with a fresh random bit and aborts the game (due to artificial abort); see [1] for more details. It follows from the proof of [1, Theorem 25] that
Game 4. We now change the way how A and B are generated in Game 3. In Game 4, A is a random matrix in Z n×m q and B is generated through TrapGen(q, n) together with an associated trapdoor T B for Λ ⊥ q (B). The construction of A i for i = 1, · · · , l remains the same as in Game 3, i.e., A i = AR * i − h i B. When A queries O Ext (ID) for the secret key of ID = (b 1 , · · · , b l ), B performs as follows:
-B sets
-If h ID = 0 then abort the game and pretend that the adversary outputs a random bit b as in Game 3.
Note that since h ID is non-zero, and so T B is also a trapdoor for h θ B. And hence the output E ID satisfies F ID · E ID = U in Z t q . Moreover, Theorem 2 shows that when σ > T B s R ω( √ m) with s R := R , the generated E ID is distributed close to D Λ U q (F ID ) as in Game 2. -Return SK ID := E ID . Game 4 is otherwise the same as Game 3. In particular, in the challenge phase, the challenger checks if
If not, the challenger aborts the game as in Game 3. Similarly, in Game 4, the challenger also implements an artificial abort in the guess phase. Since Game 3 and Game 2 are identical in the adversary's view, we have that
Game 5. Game 5 is identical to Game 4, except that the challenge ciphertext is always chosen randomly. And thus the advantage of A is always 0.
We now show that Game 4 and Game 5 are computationally indistinguishable. If the abort event happens then the games are clearly indistinguishable. We, therefore, consider only the queries that do not cause an abort.
Suppose now A has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Game 4 and Game 5. We use A to construct B to solve the LWE problem as follows.
Setup. First of all, B requests from O and receives, for each j = 1, · · · , t a fresh pair (a i , d i ) ∈ Z n q × Z q and for each i = 1, · · · , m, a fresh pair (u i , v i ) ∈ Z n q × Z q . A announces an identity ID for the target identity. B constructs the public parameter PP as follows:
1. Assemble the random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q from m of previously given LWE samples by letting the i-th column of A to be the n-vector u i for all i = 1, · · · , m. 2. Assemble the first t unused LWE samples a 1 , · · · , a t to become a public random matrix U ∈ Z n×t q . 3. Run TrapGen(q, σ) to generate uniformly random matrices A , B ∈ Z n×m q together with their trapdoor T A and T B respectively. 4. Choose l random matrices R * i ∈ {−1, 1} m×m for i = 1, · · · , l and l random scalars h i ∈ Z q for i = 1, · · · , l. Next it constructs the matrices A i for i = 1, · · · , l as
Note that it follows from the leftover hash lemma [14, Theorem 8.38 ] that A 1 , · · · , A l are statistically close to uniform. 5. Set PP := (A, A , A 1 , · · · , A l , B, U ) and send to A. Queries. B answers the queries as in Game 4, including aborting the game if needed.
Challenge. Now when A sends B two messages m 0 and m 1 and a target identity ID * . B choose a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext CT * ID * = (CT * ID * ,1 , CT * ID * ,2 , CT * ID * ,3 ) for m b as follows: 1. Choose a random s ∈ Z m q and compute
, v m from the entries of the samples to form
Then B sends CT * ID * = (CT * ID * ,1 , CT * ID * ,2 , CT * ID * ,3 ) to A. Note that in case of no abort, one has h ID * = 0 and so F ID * = (A|AR * ID * ). When the oracle is pseudorandom, i.e., O = O s then v * = A T s + y for some random noise vector y ← Ψ m α . Therefore CT * ID * ,3 in Step 5 satisfies:
Therefore CT * ID * is a valid ciphertext. When O = O $ we have that d * is uniform in Z t q and v * is uniform in Z m q . Then obviously CT * ID * ,2 is uniform. It follows also from the leftover hash lemma (cf. [14, Theorem 8.38 ]) that CT * ID * ,3 is also uniform. Guess. After Phase 2, A guesses if it is interacting with a Game 4 or Game 5.
The simulator also implements the artificial abort from Game 4 and Game 5 and output the final guess as to the answer to the LWE problem. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a direct construction of IBEET based on the hardness of Learning With Errors problem. Efficiency is the reason to avoid the instantiation of lattice-based IBEET from the generic construction by Lee et al. [7] .
In addition, we also modify our scheme to obtain an IBEET against insider attack. We will leave as a future work for improving our schemes to achieve CCA2-security as well as to support flexible authorisation. 
Extract(PP, MSK, ID) : On input the public parameter PP, a master secret key MSK and an identity ID(∈ Z n q ) = (b 1 , · · · , b l ) ∈ {−1, 1} l :
Output SK
On input the public key PK and a message m ∈ {0, 1} t do 1. Choose uniformly random s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z n q . 2. Choose x 1 , x 2 ∈ Ψ t α and compute
3. Set vk s = A 1 · · · A l . 4. Set id := H 2 (vk s ) ∈ Z n q . 5. Build the following matrices in Z n×4m q :
Choose a uniformly random n
9. Let b := H 1 (c 1 c 2 c 3 c 4 ) ∈ {−1, 1} l and define a matrix
10. Extract a signature e ∈ Z 2m×t by
Note that F · e = 0 mod q. 11. Output the ciphertext CT = (vk, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , e).
Dec(PP, SK ID , CT)
On input a secret key SK ID and a ciphertext CT, do 1. Parse the ciphertext CT into (vk, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , e).
Let
3. If F · e = 0 in Z q and e ≤ σ √ 2m then continue to Step 4; otherwise output ⊥. 4. Set id := H 2 (vk) ∈ Z n q and build the following matrices: 7. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w i and q 2 . If they are close, output m i = 1 and otherwise output m i = 0. We then obtain the message m. 8. Compute w ← c 2 − E T ID.1.vks c 4 ∈ Z t q . 9. For each i = 1, · · · , t, compare w i and q 2 . If they are close, output h i = 1 and otherwise output h i = 0. We then obtain the vector h. Test(td i , td j , CT i , CT j ) On input trapdoors td i , td j and ciphertexts CT i , CT j of users U i and U j respectively, for k = i, j, do the following 1. Parse CT k into (vk k , c k,1 , c k,2 , c k,3 , c k,4 , e k ). Proof. Since we employ the multi-bit HIBE and signature scheme from [1] , their correctness follow from [1] . The Theorem follows from [7, Theorem 1].
Sample E ID

Parameters
We follow [1, Section 8.3] for choosing parameters for our scheme. Now for the system to work correctly we need to ensure the error term in decryption is less than q/5 with high probability, i.e., q = Ω(σm 3/2 ) and α < [σlmω( √ log m)] −1 , that the TrapGen can operate, i.e., m > 6n log q, that σ is large enough for SampleLeft and SampleRight, i.e., σ > lmω( √ log m), that Regev's reduction applies, i.e., q > 2 √ n/α, Hence the following choice of parameters (q, m, σ, α) from [1] satisfies all of the above conditions, taking n to be the security parameter: m = 6n 1+δ , q = max(2Q, m 2.5 ω( log n)) σ = mlω( log n) , α = [l 2 m 2 ω( log n)]
Here we assume that δ is such that n δ > log q = O(log n).
Theorem 6. The IBEET constructed in Section 5.1 with paramaters as in (3) is IND-ID-CCA2 secure provided that H 1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33 ] and the signature is strongly unforgeable by [1, Section 7.5] . The result follows from [7, Theorem 5] .
Theorem 7 ([7, Theorem 3]). The IBEET with parameters (q, n, m, σ, α) as in (3) is OW-ID-CCA2 provided that H is one-way and H 1 is collision resistant.
Proof. The HIBE is IND-sID-CPA secure by [1, Theorem 33 ] and the signature is strongly unforgeable by [1, Section 7.5] . The result follows from [7, Theorem 6] .
